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Abstract
Based on an original dataset of merged electoral and census data, this article is a study of electoral support for the Islamist
Party in Morocco in the 2002 and 2007 elections. It differentiates between the clientelistic, grievance and horizontal
network type of supporters. We disentangle these profiles empirically on the basis of the role of education, wealth
and exclusion for Islamist votes. We find no evidence of the clientelistic profile, but a shift from grievance in 2002 to a
horizontal network profile in 2007. World Values Survey individual level data are used as a robustness check, yielding
similar results. Qualitative evidence on a changing mobilization pattern of the party between 2002 and 2007 supports
our conclusions.
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Introduction
The nature of Islamist political parties is at the core of
debates about the political future of the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA). The relevance of these debates has
increased as strong popular pressure for democratization
has ousted some MENA regimes and brought others to
enact political reforms. Indeed, Islamist parties are the
likely beneficiaries of such reforms. Yet, little is known
about the sources behind the strength of Islamist political
parties. Who votes for Islamist parties and why? To which
electorate do Islamist parties respond? In fact, there have
been as many surprise victories as surprise failures of Isla-
mist parties in recent years. For lack of data on Islamist vot-
ers, most explanations offered are directly drawn from
studies on Islamist movement organizations, such as the
Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt and Jordan. Movement
organizations and parties, however, are two different enti-
ties; they operate in different spheres, they obey different
logics, and, over time, they might develop different objec-
tives (Wegner, 2011; Wegner and Pellicer, 2009). Simi-
larly, activists – whether of the party or the movement
organizations – are different from a larger pool of sym-
pathizers: sympathizers are receptive to the ideas of the
party or movement but are not sufficiently mobilized to
engage directly in political action. In short, it is a long way
from the profile of an activist inside an Islamist movement
organization to one of a voter of an Islamist party.
To date, there are only two studies on Islamist voters
based on survey data, which, however, tend to reach differ-
ent conclusions. Garcia-Rivero and Kotze (2007) base their
analysis on the World Values Survey (WVS) for Morocco,
Algeria, Jordan and Turkey. Robbins (2009) draws on sur-
vey data from the Arab Barometer for Morocco, Algeria,
Jordan, Yemen and the West Bank and Gaza. In both stud-
ies, the only variable that is significant in all countries is
that religion should play a greater role in politics – a rather
tautological result given that this is part of the core identity
of Islamist parties. Beyond that, the results usually differ
for the same country and across countries (for Jordan, for
instance, dissatisfaction with the state/government, for
instance, is highly significant in Robbins (2009) but irrele-
vant in Garcia-Rivero and Kotze (2007)). The discrepan-
cies between these studies may partly be due to small
samples of supporters of the respective Islamist party.1
Additionally, in authoritarian settings, survey information
regarding politics has to be treated with care, as people
might not feel comfortable giving information about their
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political opinions to strangers. Support for Islamist parties
could be under-reported, as many Islamist groups are ille-
gal or have an ambiguous legal status, and even legal Isla-
mist parties and groups are often harassed by the regimes.
At the same time, overestimating of support has also
occurred. In Morocco, a 2006 poll attributed 47 percent
vote intention for the Islamists compared to around 3 per-
cent of registered voters who voted for the party one year
later;2 also, overestimating occurs in the 2007 WVS for
Morocco, although less extreme.3
This article complements the emerging literature on
Islamist voters in a study of the electoral support for the
Moroccan Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in
2002 and 2007 based on an original dataset of merged
electoral and census data. We derive stylized profiles of
Islamist supporters from the literature on Islamic acti-
vism, differentiating between clientelistic, grievance and
horizontal network types of supporters. These potential
voters differ in their degree of education, wealth and
inclusion and have different demands and expectations
vis-a`-vis the Islamist party. We propose distinguishing
between clientelistic and the other profiles on the basis
of the role of education: if support is driven by cliente-
lism, PJD votes should be negatively related to education
levels. We distinguish between grievance and horizontal
network profiles on the basis of wealth and inclusion, con-
ditional on education: if the dominant pattern of support is
based on grievances, PJD votes should be associated with
relative poverty and exclusion for a given level of educa-
tion. The opposite would apply in the case of a horizontal
network profile.
We find a strong positive relation between education
and PJD votes in the two years, thus concluding that sup-
port for Moroccan Islamists was not driven by a cliente-
listic rationale in either of the two elections. However,
we find an important difference between 2002 and 2007
regarding the role of wealth and inclusion conditional on
education, turning from negative to positive. Thus we con-
clude that in 2002 the pattern of support was close to a grie-
vance type of profile but changed in 2007 to resemble more
closely the horizontal network type.
Our analysis potentially suffers from limitations of its
own, notably the risk of ecological fallacy. Our inferences
on PJD support are necessarily based on differences in
averages of districts, not on differences among individuals.
In our case, the risk is a priori important because the dis-
tricts in our data are relatively large (300,000 inhabitants
on average). However, spatial inequalities in Morocco are
such that they yield what we believe is sufficient heteroge-
neity across districts in our key variables (literacy, for
example, ranges almost uniformly from as little as 30 to
80 percent across districts). To address the possibility of
ecological fallacy, we perform the same type of analysis
using individual data from the WVS on intended PJD sup-
port in 2001/2002 and 2007. The results from this analysis
are remarkably in line with our previous one regarding the
relation between individual PJD support intention and our
indicators of education and wealth.
Finally, we discuss qualitative evidence on a changing
mobilization pattern of the PJD, which evolved from a pro-
nounced opposition profile to a rather tame, technocratic
one, a trajectory consistent with our quantitative analyses.
Overall, our findings suggest that the electorate of Islamist
parties is not composed of a stable support base of commit-
ted ideologues, but varies according to the party’s mobili-
zation decisions.
Section 2 derives the profiles of Islamist supporters.
Section 3 provides a brief background of Moroccan poli-
tics. Section 4 describes the data. Sections 5 and 6 present
the findings on electoral support for the Moroccan Islamist
party in 2002 and 2007, discussing commonalities and dif-
ferences respectively. Section 7 concludes.
Profiles of Islamist supporters
The literature on Islamic activism provides a variety of
answers to the question of who supports Islamist groups
and why. As mentioned, few studies have used survey data
and looked specifically at support for Islamist parties – as
opposed to Islamist movement organizations. Given the
dearth of studies focusing on Islamist parties specifically,
we draw on both party and movement studies to establish
ideal types of Islamist supporters. For our purpose, we sys-
tematize, unify and simplify answers provided by these
studies in order to derive profiles that are stylized and can
be operationalized to guide the subsequent analysis. Our
reading of the literature yields three types of profile with
different socio-economic and political characteristics and
expectations towards the Islamist party: (a) a clientelist
profile, (b) a grievance-driven profile, and (c) a horizontal
network profile of Islamist support. An overview of these
profiles is given in Table 1.4
The clientelist and grievance profiles are probably the
most common reasons cited for individuals supporting Isla-
mists groups, passively or actively. The clientelist profile
of an Islamist activist or supporter is generally placed in the
context of the inability of Arab states to provide public
goods and employment for their citizens. Islamist groups
have stepped in to provide education, hospitals, jobs, cloth-
ing, low cost credit, etc., to the poor. These charitable activ-
ities are thought to be ‘networks of patronage and
clientship‘ (Zubaida, 1992: 9) where recipients of benefits
become supporters in exchange (see Fuller, 2003; Layachi
and Haireche, 1992; Roussillon, 1991).5 As Toth puts it, the
poor ‘gratefully appreciated‘ these services, whereas the
Islamists benefited from ‘the allegiance they won from
doing their good deeds‘ (2003: 559), and when Islamists
entered electoral contests they ‘received overwhelming
support and loyalty from those they had once assisted‘
(ibid.). Thus, a patron–client relationship is formed in
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which the Islamists help out poor, uneducated, vulnerable
and excluded individuals, and the latter support them. In
elections, such a clientelist voter would not ask for specific
policies or more substantial political change, she would
simply reward services provided by the Islamists in the past
or future with her vote.
The grievance-driven supporter profile is also placed in
the context of economic development failure of MENA
regimes. In contrast to the clientelist profile, however,
these grievances are mainly seen as relative deprivation
suffered by recently educated MENA citizens. Lacking
employment opportunities, the unfulfilled aspirations of
potentially upwardly mobile individuals transform into a
demand for change (see, among many others, Carvalho
(2009), Woltering (2002), Nachtwey and Tessler (1999)
and Tessler (1997); see Wiktorowicz (2004) for a survey
of this work).6 Such change, in turn, is being promised
most convincingly by Islamist groups, the only sizeable
opposition in the MENA. It is thus a fact that Islamist par-
ties are the most promising and credible opposition to the
status quo that would account for Islamist party support
(Garcia Rivero and Kotze, 2007). The grievance profile
that emerges from this literature is thus that of an individ-
ual with few resources relative to her expectations and
education, excluded from the main networks of privilege
and deeply frustrated with the system. An Islamist party
would be supported as long as it is a credible vehicle of
protest.
The horizontal network supporter profile emerges from
recent research that bring insights from social movement
theory to bear on the analysis of Islamist movements (see
Wiktorowitz (2004) and Baylouny (2004), and particularly
Wickham (2002) and Clark (2004)). These studies argue
that grievances do not translate automatically into collec-
tive action. They conclude that Islamist movements recruit
supporters along horizontal, not vertical, lines (as it would
be the case in the clientelist profile). In turn, movement
organizations should be considered as horizontal networks.
As the core of the organizations consists of educated,
upwardly mobile, middle class individuals, horizontal
recruitment implies that the same type of characteristics
would apply to Islamist supporters. These individuals gen-
erally stand in the ‘middle’. They are neither rich nor poor;
struggling, but not for survival (for instance, a doctor
moonlighting); not included within a powerful system of
privileges, but not abjectly excluded either (for instance,
they may have a contact or two in the administration). Isla-
mist movements, and, by extension, Islamist parties are
appealing as horizontal networks that connect these indi-
viduals. An Islamist voter would thus be an individual who
supports what he sees as a party of like-minded individuals.
It would be someone who would benefit from increased
transparency and better public services promised by many
Islamist parties. This individual would vote along program-
matic lines. However, rather than asking for radical and/or
substantial change (as in the grievance profile), the hori-
zontal network supporter would ask for a change of policies
rather than of politics.
We operationalize these profiles for the empirical anal-
ysis, making use of three variables (see 4th column in Table
1): education, wealth and exclusion from state networks.
Different combinations of these variables capture the
essence of each of the profiles. In the clientelistic-type of
explanation, the supporter would be poor, excluded and
uneducated. A grievance explanation would imply that
Islamist voters generally have little wealth/inclusion rela-
tive to their aspirations, especially when they have a higher
level of education. In the horizontal network explanation,
Islamist supporters would be highly educated, but not poor
or excluded.
As our data are not at the individual but at the district
level (see section 4), we make inferences by comparing dis-
tricts. If party–voter linkages were of a clientelistic type,
the PJD should do better in districts (see column 5 in Table
1) with low education levels. If the grievance explanation
held in Morocco, the electoral results should be better in
districts with a high level of education and, conditional
on education, better in poorer and excluded districts.
Finally, horizontal network voters should be prominent if
the PJD did better in districts with a high level of education
and, conditional on education, support were unrelated to
wealth and exclusion.
Table 1. Profiles of potential Islamist voters.
Profile Characteristics
Expectations from
Islamist Party (IP) Operationalization Inference
Clientelism Poor, vulnerable Patronage Low education
Poor Excluded
IP results better in low education
districts
Grievances Frustrated
aspirations
Radical change High education
Poor and excluded
relative to education
IP better in high education districts
Conditional on education, better in
poorer and excluded districts
Horizontal
network
Educated
(professionals)
Moderate change
(policies)
High education
Medium wealth
Medium exclusion
IP better in high education districts
Conditional on education, unrelated
to wealth and exclusion
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Political parties and Islamist groups
in Morocco
The political system in Morocco is best described as an
authoritarian monarchy. Political parties have existed since
independence in 1956, but the real power is concentrated in
the palace. There are essentially two types of political par-
ties. First, the so-called ‘palace parties‘ created by and/or
loyal to the king, including the Mouvement Populaire
(MP), the Rassemblement National des Inde´pendants (RNI)
and the Union Constitutionnelle (UC). Second, the so-
called ‘traditional opposition‘, including the Istiqlal party,
the leftist Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP)
and the once-communist Parti du Progres et du Socialisme
(PPS).7 Up to the mid-1990s, parliament was only partially
directly elected and wielded little power; massive electoral
fraud ensured the domination by the palace parties.8
In the 1990s, King Hassan II enacted political liberaliza-
tion measures, including two constitutional reforms that
transferred more power to the elected government and par-
liament, introduced a second chamber and provided for the
direct election of parliament. Elections became gradually
more transparent. In 1997, in what came to be known as
the alternance, the traditional opposition parties were
asked by the king to form a government. The emerging
government was headed by the USFP, including the Istiqlal
and the PPS, and also some palace parties. Much hope was
placed in the alternance to change politics – and the config-
uration of political power – in Morocco (Ferrie´, 1999;
Tozy, 1999b). The performance of the alternance govern-
ment, including its record on human rights and social pol-
icies was disappointing, however, and popular enthusiasm
soon faded.9 The same applies to the subsequent govern-
ment (2002–2007) composed of the same parties.
Despite these reforms, the king did keep a firm grip on
power, helped by the dividedness of opposition forces. For
instance, the king controls key ministries (such as the Min-
istry of the Interior and Defence), appoints the secretaries
of state of all ministries, all the governors, judges and
magistrates and controls the military (Maghraoui, 2002).
This configuration of power remained unchanged under
King Hassan II’s successor Mohammed VI, but could
potentially be challenged by a united government that
asserts the constitutional right of representative political
institutions vis-a`-vis the monarchy. Recent Moroccan
elections are considered much less fraudulent than most
elections in other MENA countries: benefiting from a
fragmented opposition, regime intervention into elections
mainly consists of very active gerrymandering and of tol-
erating vote buying (Storm, 2008).
The Islamist movement in Morocco can be divided into
two main strands. Justice and Charity is considered the
most popular (Cavatorta, 2007). It refuses to participate
in elections under the current conditions10 and instructs its
members to boycott elections.11 The second strand is the
Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR). This group had
wanted to participate in the political process since the late
1980s, and is the one behind the creation of the Party of Jus-
tice and Development (PJD). The two strands of the Isla-
mist movement are believed to be mainly urban in their
outreach (Munson, 1986).12
The PJD first participated in elections in 1997.13 Since
then, it has gradually grown stronger, increasing its (official)
votes from around 250,000 (nine seats out of 325) in 1997 to
around half a million votes (42 seats out of 325) in 2002. In
the legislative elections of 2007, the party was expected to
win by a landslide.14 However, it only increased its seats
by two and lost close to 100,000 votes. That the PJD tripled
its seats while doubling its votes only from 1997 to 2002
is mainly the result of a change of electoral law between
these elections. Up to the 2000s, elections in Morocco
were held under a simple first-past-the-post system. A new
law before the 2002 elections changed this into a closed list
proportional system, a reform promoted by opposition par-
ties, including the PJD. A 3 percent threshold was intro-
duced. The district magnitude of the new districts
remained small, with a minimum of two and a maximum
of five seats per district. The average district magnitude
being 3.25 in 2002 and 3.1 in 2007, the new electoral sys-
tem looks rather like a disguised majority system (San-
tucci, 2005).
The PJD’s original platform and parliamentary interven-
tions focused on typical Islamist items, such as authenti-
city, morality, the promotion of Morocco’s Islamic
identity, arabization, the evils of alcohol, the liberation of
Palestine and the like (see Willis (1999) and Wegner
(2007)). Importantly, the party added the demand for con-
stitutional reforms – aimed to strengthen the rule of law and
the prerogatives of representative institutions – to its plat-
form after the death of King Hassan II in 1999 (Wegner,
2011). Given the low levels of trust Moroccans have in
political parties, the party’s focus on hard work and the
integrity of its MPs as well as the grassroots campaigns run
by party members and Islamist activists were at least
equally relevant for establishing its profile as a party that
would make a difference (ibid.). Over the years, the PJD’s
platform became more elaborate and the party’s campaigns
more professional. In 2007 – for reasons that will be dis-
cussed below – the party’s platform changed to address
more seriously economic and social policies and grassroots
campaigning decreased considerably.
Data
The study is based on an original dataset consisting of
merged data on electoral results and the 2004 census. Elec-
tion data cover the elections of 2002 and 2007. In both
years the election data include the votes received by all par-
ties, as well as the turnout and the number of null votes at
the electoral district level.15 The census data are aggregated
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at the municipal level, with 1692 municipalities.16 The data
include socio-economic variables, such as population, age,
gender, education and certain occupation categories, as
well as housing variables, such as the type and age of
houses, access to electricity and water, and household items
such as satellite dishes, telephones and WCs.17
The merging of census and electoral data was based on
the administrative units published in the Bulletin Officiel of
15 August 2002 for 2002, and the Bulletin Officiel of 5
April 2007 for 2007. Notice that the same census data are
used for the two elections. The merging was somewhat
more problematic for 2002, because some administrative
units changed between 2002 and 2004, the year of the cen-
sus. For robustness checks, we rely on an alternative source
of data that includes some of the relevant census variables.
These data come from the National Documentation Center
also belonging to the Haut Commissariat du Plan. The data
are already aggregated at the electoral district level so that
there are no merging problems. However, since the mer-
ging process of these data is not transparent, we use the
original census data for the main analysis.
Electoral and census data appear to be relatively reli-
able. As mentioned, official electoral results in 2002 and
2007 can be considered as reasonably accurate; in 2007,
international observers who had been allowed to monitor
the elections concluded that they had been transparent
(NDI, 2007). The major complaints were about vote buying
and were voiced loudly by the PJD itself. For our purposes,
this is unproblematic: an individual who sells her vote to
another party is rightly considered as not supporting the
Islamist party. Regarding the census data, some basic pat-
terns appear as expected. For instance, the degree of urba-
nization correlates strongly with illiteracy; most college
graduates and satellite dishes are found in Rabat Ocean and
in Casablanca Anfa, which are upmarket neighbourhoods
of political and economic capital, respectively; most slums
are found around Casablanca and these display low educa-
tion, low level occupations and few household comfort
items.
The main dependent variable used is PJD votes as a
percent of registered voters. This is the closest indicator
for PJD support in the population. It differs substantially
from the percent of cast votes received by the PJD because
turnout varies systematically with PJD success. For exam-
ple, in 2007, in certain districts of Casablanca, among
those that voted a large proportion voted for the PJD
(around 30 percent), but turnout was unusually low there,
around 25 percent, so that only around 7 percent of regis-
tered voters actually supported the PJD. Abstentionists
should be considered to have made a choice not to support
any party; the figure of 7 percent therefore reflects better
PJD support in these districts of Casablanca than that of 30
percent.
The explanatory variables to be used are proxies for the
variables arising in the profiles of Islamist supporters
discussed above: education, wealth and exclusion from
state networks. For education, we use mainly literacy,
although we also use university education for robustness
checks. For wealth, we use the percent of satellite dishes
and the percent of mobile phones for robustness checks.
Although satellite dishes and mobile phones can be seen
often in poor areas, even in slums, they do appear to be
a good proxy for wealth. According to our data there is
a large variation in these variables across circumscrip-
tions. The percent of satellite dishes ranges from 7 to
62, while the figures for mobile phones are 26 percent and
81 percent. Moreover, the circumscriptions with the low-
est percentages have characteristics that make them
indeed appear as poor, such as very low literacy rates,
very low percent of employers, of villas, etc., while the
reverse applies to the circumscriptions with high percent
of mobile phones and satellite dishes.18 Exclusion from
state networks is proxied by the percent of public employ-
ees. Providing public employment is generally considered
a deliberate cooptation strategy of authoritarian regimes
(see, for instance, Levitsky and Way (2010) and Yom
(2009)). By extension, areas where regimes provide more
public employment than in other, similar, areas can be
seen as particular targets of inclusion into state networks.
Besides these variables, as a complement, we use the
degree of urbanization, some occupational categories and
housing types. Table 2 shows the mean, minimum, maxi-
mum values and intermediate quartiles of these variables
in the dataset.19
An important concern regarding the data is the degree of
aggregation and, in particular, the potential for incurring
ecological fallacy. Essentially, the use of district level data
means that inferences, say, on education, are drawn by
comparing voting results of districts with many educated
individuals to those with few educated individuals. The
ecological fallacy would imply that even if the PJD obtains
more votes in districts with more educated individuals, it
does not follow that it is the educated themselves that have
more propensity to vote for the PJD. The risk of ecological
fallacy decreases the more homogenous districts are
internally and the more heterogeneity there is across dis-
tricts. This is a potentially important concern for our anal-
ysis, since the districts in our data are relatively large: the
number of districts in the analysis is only 95 (91 for 2002),
with an average population of around 300,000. We
believe, however, that there is sufficient heterogeneity
across districts in the variables of interest to perform a
meaningful analysis. Our key explanatory variables are
literacy and satellite dishes. As can be seen from Table
2, literacy levels cover a wide range, from 30 to 80 per-
cent, with a quarter of the observations below 45 percent
and another quarter above 65 percent. For satellite dishes,
districts range from 7 percent to 61 percent, with a quarter
of the observations below 20 percent and another quarter
above 41 percent.
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Commonalities between 2002 and 2007:
No clientelist support profile
Profile of PJD strongholds
Figure 1 shows the distribution of PJD support across dis-
tricts for 2002 and 2007. The figure displays the kernel den-
sity of districts in which the PJD obtained different levels
of support. The first feature to notice is how small the num-
bers on the horizontal axis are. In most districts, only a
small minority of registered voters cast their ballot for the
PJD. In the few districts where the PJD did extraordinarily
well, only around 10 percent of these voted for them in any
given year. That one of the strongest parties in Morocco
appeals to such a small fraction of the electorate highlights,
on the one hand, the degree of disaffection of the Moroccan
population with the type of elections offered by the palace
and the fragmentation of the Moroccan party system, on the
other.
The second observation is that one can distinguish sev-
eral groups of districts on the basis of PJD support. This is
most clear in 2002, with two pronounced humps with
modes at 8 percent and at 0 percent, reflecting the PJD
strongholds and the districts where the PJD did poorly or
chose not to run.20 In 2007, there are also two main groups
(with humps at 3 percent and 6 percent), plus two outliers
where the PJD had exceptionally high support.21
In which way do PJD strongholds differ from districts
where the PJD enjoys little support? Table 3 shows the
profiles of districts with different levels of PJD support
in both elections. PJD strongholds have a characteristic pro-
file. They are more urban, wealthier and more educated than
average. They also display more public and private employ-
ees but less self-employed, and more apartments and villas
but less rural houses.22
Clientelism? Education and PJD support
The urban character and above average education found in
PJD strongholds provides some first evidence against the
Clientelist-type of profile. In this section, we evaluate these
commonalities of the PJD voter profile in more detail. First,
we study more closely the relationship between PJD votes
and education and consider whether the educated profile of
PJD voters might be the outcome of other factors, such as
the degree of urbanization. Second, we study how turnout
is related to PJD votes. Third, we compare the PJD to other
Moroccan parties, demonstrating that the PJD stands out as
the only Moroccan party whose electorate appears to be
voting on a programmatic basis rather than having cliente-
listic motivations for its support.
Table 2. Summary of variables.
PJD votes Mean Min 1st quarter Median
3rd
quarter Max.
Urban 55 7 29 51 79 100
Education Literacy 56 31 48 54 65 81
College 5 1 3 4 5 20
Resources Satellite 32 9 21 31 41 63
Mobile phone 58 27 49 57 68 82
Occupation Employer 2 0 1 2 2 6
Self-employed with shop 21 7 14 22 27 35
Self-employed at home 2 0 1 2 3 11
Self-employed street vendor 7 2 5 7 9 14
Public employee 14 3 8 10 16 53
Private employee 39 9 29 37 48 68
Helping the family 14 1 4 13 22 49
Housing type Villa 2 0 0 1 2 10
Apartment 5 0 1 1 6 46
Moroccan house 48 9 35 49 64 89
Figure 1. Density of PJD votes 2002 and 2007.
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Figure 2 shows that there is a linear and relatively tight
positive relation between literacy and PJD support both in
2002 and in 2007. The relation is tighter in 2007, so that the
two outliers mentioned above are clearly visible. For 2002,
part of the extra-residual variability comes from the large
amount of districts that the PJD did not cover.
The risk of ecological fallacy is always present in anal-
yses of aggregate data like these. We believe, however, that
Table 3. Profile of districts with different levels of PJD support.
2002 2007
PJD votes
Not
covered < 6% > 6% (0.4) (4.8) (8.12)
Freq 35 27 29 68 24 2
Urban 40 47 80 45 79 50
Education Literacy 49 52 67 52 67 50
College 3 4 7 4 7 3
Resources Satellite dish 26 29 42 28 42 26
Mobile phone 51 56 68 54 69 51
Occupation Employer 2 2 2 2 2 2
Self-empl with shop 25 22 15 23 15 26
Self-empl at home 2 0 2 2 2 5
Self-empl/street vendor 7 7 9 7 9 9
Public employee 13 12 15 12 16 10
Private employee 31 37 50 36 49 27
Helping the family 19 16 6 17 7 21
Housing type Villa 1 1 3 1 3 1
Apartment 1 4 12 2 14 1
Moroccan house 41 46 59 44 57 48
Slum 8 7 9 8 10 7
Rural house 45 39 13 40 13 41
Figure 2. Relation between literacy and PJD votes 2002 (left panel) and 2007 (right panel).
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the particular pattern shown in the data reduces the con-
cerns about the importance of this fallacy in our analysis.
Particularly for 2007, the whole conditional distribution
of PJD votes appears to increase in a remarkably constant
and uniform way with education. We believe it unlikely
that it is precisely the uneducated that are voting for the
PJD uniformly more as the percent of educated in the
respective district increases, as the ecological fallacy, if
correct, would imply.23
Nevertheless, biases in our result may still come from
variables that are strongly related to education, so that their
variation might generate a relation such as the one in Figure
2. We consider potential key sources of bias, starting with
factors related to the rural/urban divide. Education is
strongly related to urbanization in Morocco and it could
be the latter that drives support in reality. In this case, the
pattern in the figure would give a biased interference of the
role of education – and hence, clientelism – for PJD sup-
port.24 To explore the possibility of this type of bias, we
regress PJD support on urbanization, together with literacy.
As Table 4 shows, education appears as strongly related to
PJD support in both years, even when accounting for urba-
nization levels. In fact, it is interesting to note that the effect
of urbanization disappears once education is introduced
into the regression. This suggests that education is one of
the main drivers of the urban/rural divide in PJD support.
Another possible source of bias relevant to our discus-
sion is related to turnout. In many countries, educated indi-
viduals tend to be more politicized and vote more (Jackson,
1995; Sondheimer and Green, 2010). Our results could thus
simply be driven by higher turnout in more educated dis-
tricts. However, in authoritarian elections abstention is
often a signal of protest and it is generally found to be
higher among middle class voters (i.e. the more educated)
(Ghandi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Karklins, 1986). The poor
and voters in rural areas – usually the less educated – turn
out in larger numbers, precisely because they are more vul-
nerable to clientelistic mobilization strategies (Blaydes,
2006). Indeed, in Morocco, more educated individuals
voted less, rather than more in 2002 and 2007; they also
cast more null votes (see Table 5).25 The result regarding
education and PJD support is thus remarkably strong: even
if districts with higher education levels tend have lower
turnout, the PJD obtained most support in these. Indeed,
as the table shows, there is a negative correlation between
turnout and PJD votes.
It is noteworthy that the PJD appears to be an exception
rather than the norm not only regarding the education pat-
tern of its electorate but also regarding the correlation
between support and turnout. As Table 5 shows, the PJD
is almost the only party where support is positively related
to literacy, abstention and null votes. The opposite is true
for most of the other relevant parties in Morocco.26 To the
extent that illiteracy and high turnout are indicators of cli-
entelistic voting it appears that all other major parties in
Morocco rely to some extent on clientelistic linkages. To
the extent that abstention and null votes are indicators of
protest, the PJD is the only major party successful in
Table 4. Regression PJD vote-share on urbanization and literacy.
2002 2007
(Intercept) –0.59 (0.66) –8.27 (2.16)** 1.24 (0.29)** –3.57 (0.96)**
lozTRUE 6.68 (0.98) ** 7.21 (0.87)**
Urban 0.08 (0.01)** 0.00 (0.02) 3.45 (0.47) ** –1.25 (0.99)
Literacy 0.22 (0.06)** 0.13 (0.03)**
Dependent variable: PJD votes as percent of registered voters.
lozTRUE is a dummy for the districts Larache and Oed Zem Bejaad shown above to be outliers in 2007.
**Significance at the 1% level; *significance at the 10% level.
Table 5. Bivariate correlations between literacy, turnout, null votes and party votes.
2002 2007
Literacy Turnout Nulls/Turnout Literacy Turnout Nulls/Turnout
Literacy 1 –0.154 0.424 1 –0.5502 0.653
Turnout –0.154 1 –0.298 –0.5502 1 –0.6464
Nulls/Turnout 0.424 –0.298 1 0.653 –0.6464 1
Votes.PJD 0.688 –0.283 0.447 0.6268 –0.2806 0.5426
Votes USFP 0.214 –0.029 0.219 –0.2949 0.5259 –0.306
Votes.PI –0.083 0.189 –0.198 –0.1366 0.5078 –0.2909
Votes RNI –0.292 0.165 –0.341 –0.1997 0.3259 –0.2638
Votes MP –0.244 0.202 –0.174 –0.1205 0.3619 –0.0841
Votes UC –0.054 0.21 –0.139 –0.2482 0.3357 –0.2427
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districts with a protest environment. Compared to other
major Moroccan parties, both the former opposition and
parties associated closely with the regime, the PJD is thus
the only party with a clear non-clientelistic voter profile
in 2002 and 2007.
This evidence is reinforced by qualitative evidence on
the PJD’s party organization. In general, programmatic par-
ties are thought to have a stronger party organization and to
exert more control over candidates and elected representa-
tives than clientelistic ones (Desposato, 2006; Taylor-
Robinson, 2006). Along a similar line, procedures for the
selection of candidates and party leaders are likely to be
more transparent and institutionalized than in clientelistic
parties.27 Measured by these criteria, the PJD again stands
out among Moroccan parties, where floor crossing is ubi-
quitous, internal elections are rare and opaque, and secure
list positions are often sold in national elections (Santucci,
2001; Willis, 2002b). As Wegner (2011) shows, the PJD
has strong voting discipline at both the local and the
national level, sanctions floor crossing, has a strong prefer-
ence for party candidates and has made internal democracy
an important part of its identity.28
In sum, a clientelistic supporter profile of PJD voters is
not supported for the PJD in any election so far. In both
2002 and 2007, the PJD did substantially worse in less edu-
cated places, where clientelism ought to be more prevalent.
Indeed, consistently with a clientelistic logic, less educated
districts did vote more, but these votes went to parties other
than the PJD. Moreover, the PJD appears to aim at pro-
grammatic rather than clientelistic linkages with the voters.
Differences between 2002 and 2007: From
grievances to educated network
Changes from 2002 to 2007
Beyond this important commonality, the data reveal differ-
ences in the pattern of Islamist support between 2002 and
2007. That changes occurred between the two elections can
already be appreciated in the particular distribution of votes
across districts, shown in Figure 1. The distribution for
2002 is clearly more dispersed, with more density (dis-
tricts) at the two extremes. The left side of the graph is
partly explained by the fact that in 2002 the PJD did not
cover all districts (only 61 percent). The other side is more
meaningful from a support perspective: the right hump of
2002 with support around 8 percent moves leftwards in
2007. This suggests that, in 2007, the PJD systematically
lost support in its traditional strongholds.
This idea is further evidenced by comparing the districts
where the PJD did best. Wegner and Pellicer (2010) com-
pare the top PJD districts in 1997, 2002 and 2007. The data
show that the areas where the PJD did best in 1997 and in
2002 essentially coincide. For example, both in 1997 and
in 2002 five out of the top ten districts are in Casablanca.
Other areas that figure prominently in both years are Agadir
and Tangier. In 2007, however, the locations differ signif-
icantly. Casablanca becomes much less prominent (only
two districts among the top ten); Agadir and Tangier disap-
pear, while Rabat rises to prominence and Kenitra appears.
In general, there seems to be gravitation away from former
strongholds toward the political centre.
From grievance to educated network
In which way did the pattern of PJD support change? We
argue that the change entailed a move from an electorate
characterized by a predominantly grievance-type of profile
to a predominantly horizontal network type. As discussed
above, the PJD was successful particularly in more edu-
cated districts, in districts with high aspirations in both
elections. The question we now consider is whether, within
those districts, the PJD’s appeal was larger in more
excluded/poorer places, consistent with a grievance type
of profile or vice versa, reflecting the educated network
profile. In order to answer this question, we divide the dis-
tricts on the basis of literacy levels and, within each level,
we compare PJD results, first, for different values of exclu-
sion, and, second, for different levels of resources. Finally,
as robustness checks, we perform regression analyses under
different specifications.
Consider first exclusion – proxied by the percent of pub-
lic employees. Figure 3 shows the percent of literacy and
public employees in each 2007 district.29 The dotted lines
break the districts according to exclusion and education;
three education groups, each subdivided in two exclusion
groups. At the bottom left of the graph are districts with few
literates and few public employees. These are essentially
Figure 3. Percent of literacy and public employees (2007).
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rural districts. The relation between literacy and public
employees is relatively tight among them. In this group,
there is little variation in exclusion conditional on educa-
tion – more education is associated with more inclusion.
This implies that in this group the identification of grie-
vances vs. horizontal network profiles will be difficult.
Beyond this rural group, the variation in public employees
for given literacy rates increases substantially, giving rise
to identifiable groups. In the middle of the graph are dis-
tricts with intermediate education levels. Among these, the
bottom shows districts with few public employees – essen-
tially the middle sized towns, such as Meknes, Marrakesh,
Al Jadida, Agadir, etc. The top displays districts with sim-
ilar education levels but large amounts of public employ-
ees. These are mainly districts in the South, including the
annexed Western Sahara. Finally, on the right side of the
graph are districts with high education levels. Here, the
groups given by exclusion are the starkest. On the bottom
right are districts with high literacy but few public employ-
ees. These correspond mainly to the Casablanca area. On
the top right are districts with abundance of both – essen-
tially Rabat and its periphery.
To disentangle between grievance and education net-
work profiles we need to compare PJD results for given
education groups across different degrees of exclusion.
We focus particularly on places with intermediate and high
levels of education. This is primarily because both the edu-
cation network and the grievance profiles presuppose a cer-
tain degree of aspiration given by education. A second
reason is that, as we just saw, in the low education (rural)
districts there is little variation of public employees condi-
tional on education. Therefore, the key question to ask is
whether the PJD does better in Casablanca as opposed to
Rabat, and in middle sized towns as opposed to the South.30
Table 6 shows the results, displaying PJD support in dif-
ferent inclusion/education cells, for 2002 and 2007. Con-
sider first the difference in PJD support across education
groups (i.e. across columns). For both years, regardless of
exclusion, PJD support rises as we move to the right in the
table, showing an increase in support in more educated dis-
tricts. This is the result discussed in section 5 above.
The comparison across rows, for given columns, how-
ever, differs across years. In 2002, conditional on educa-
tion, the PJD did better in more excluded districts (in
districts with fewer public employees). In 2007, this effect
disappears and PJD support moves away from the grie-
vance profile: The pattern is reversed for the top group of
literacy (70,100). In this group, the PJD now won more
support in more included districts. In the middle group of
literacy (55,70), support in the included and excluded
groups almost converges. In fact, the change in the pattern
of support is due to the disproportionate losses the PJD suf-
fered in the more excluded areas (Casablanca and Towns).
Although the PJD lost support in most districts with the
exception of the South and the rural areas, it lost most sup-
port in the areas prone to grievance supporters.31
We now consider the results using resources. We follow
the same procedure as with exclusion. Figure 4 breaks the
districts according to literacy and satellite dishes (as Figure
3 did for public employees).
The relation of literacy and satellite dishes is much tigh-
ter than with public employees, in this case particularly in
high education districts. This implies that attempts at unco-
vering the effect of resources for given degree of literacy
are more difficult than was the case with exclusion. The
patterns nevertheless are similar, as shown in Table 7. The
pattern of support across wealth groups for given education
changes from 2002 to 2007. In 2002, for all education
groups, the PJD did better in poorer places relative to richer
ones, reflecting a grievance driven supporter profile. In
2007, the results reverse, reflecting a horizontal network
profile. As in the case of exclusion, the PJD loses support
in all former strongholds, but particularly in those with
fewer resources.32
In order to verify whether the results in the previous
tables were induced by the particular threshold chosen for
the groups we perform OLS regressions of PJD votes on lit-
eracy and public employees, on the one hand, and on literacy
and resources, on the other. The results are given in Table 8.
The first columns show the results of the regressions for
2007 and 2002, using the full sample. The first column con-
siders exclusion and the second column considers resources.
Table 6. PJD results by education and inclusion.
2002
Literacy
(0.55) (55.70) (70.100)
Public employees (20.100) South 2.6 Rabat 7.3
(0.20) Rural 1.5 Towns 5.5 Csb 9.3
2007 Literacy
(0.55) (55,70) (70,100)
Public employees (20.100) South 3.4 Rabat 6
(0.20) Rural 2.4 Towns 3.8 Csb 4.8
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In both cases we control for literacy (and degree of urbani-
zation, in order to make it comparable the regression shown
in Table 4). Thus, we obtain the effect of inclusion and
resources on PJD votes conditional on education. The results
are in line with the evidence shown before: for 2007, the
coefficients for public employees and resources are positive
and insignificant; for 2002, the signs are reversed: both are
negative, and the coefficient for public employees is strongly
significant. Therefore, the table shows some evidence that,
conditional on education, the PJD had more support in
poorer or more excluded places in 2002, but that the pattern
broke in 2007. In addition, it is worth noting that, for the two
years, the results for urbanization and literacy are the same
as in table 4: literacy has a positive and strongly significant
coefficient, and urbanization is insignificant throughout. The
last columns of the table display the results of the same
regression considering only districts with high education
(more literacy than the median). In this way we incorporate
the fact that grievances require a certain degree of aspira-
tions, proxied by a certain degree of education. The results
are essentially the same as before. Inclusion and wealth are
positive and insignificant in 2007, and turn negative in 2002.
Actually, the results are stronger in this case, since satellite
dishes become almost significant at the 90 percent level
despite using fewer observations.33
Overall, bearing in mind the limitations of the data, we
are confident about the message of the data regarding clien-
telism: the PJD seems consistently to obtain significantly
better results in more educated districts. As to the changes
from 2002 to 2007, we find evidence that there has been
indeed a change in the pattern of support: the PJD has lost
ground in its past strongholds. There is some uncertainty
regarding the starting point of the process: For 2002 there
is some evidence of a grievance profile, but the evidence
is not that strong. The evidence for the end point is stron-
ger: the data suggest quite strongly that the pattern of sup-
port in 2007 was that of horizontal network and definitely
not of the grievance type.
This last statement is reinforced in an additional inter-
esting manner. Table 9 provides evidence that the party that
corresponds to the grievance profile in 2007 is the ‘party of
abstention’. The pattern is clear: Abstention occurred in
places with more education, but with fewer public employ-
ees and satellite dishes conditional on education. Interest-
ingly, the pattern is stronger for 2007 than for 2002,
suggesting that protest voters had largely abandoned offi-
cial politics by 2007.
Evidence from the World Values Survey
In the following, we discuss data from the World Values
Survey (WVS) as a robustness check of our results. The
picture that emerges from these data confirms the impor-
tance of education for PJD support in 2002 and 2007. It
also suggests that PJD support in 2007 resembled a hori-
zontal network type of support, coming from a grievance
profile.
The WVS is a widely used survey that has been investi-
gating political, social and cultural attitudes and value
change around the world since the 1980s. Morocco was
included in the 1999–2004 and the 2005–2008 waves of the
WVS. The survey was carried out in Morocco in 2001–
2002 and 2007, respectively. In 2001/2002 before the elec-
tions, in 2007 right after the elections (the elections were on
the 7th of September and the survey was carried out from
the 15th to the 7th of October). The sample sizes for
2001–2002 and 2007 are 2264 and 1200, respectively, and
include individuals over 18 years old. In addition to attitu-
dinal variables, the survey includes questions on party sup-
port (which party individuals would vote for if there were
elections tomorrow), education levels and self-ranking of
social class. In our analysis, we recode the education vari-
able to contain completed levels of education (none,
primary, secondary and university) with values 0 to 3. As
a measure of wealth we use the self-ranking in terms of
Figure 4. Percent of literacy and satellite dishes (2007).
Table 7. PJD results by education and resources.
2002
Literacy
(0.55) (55,70) (70,100)
Satellite dishes (45,100) 0.9 2.2 8.2
(0.45) 1.5 5 9.6
2007 Literacy
(0.55) (55,70) (70,100)
Satellite dishes (45,100) 2.9 3.8 5.5
(0.45) 2.4 3.6 4.5
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class, which we recode from ‘Lower Class’, ‘Working
Class’, ‘Lower Middle Class’, ‘Upper Middle Class’ and
‘Upper Class’ to values 0 to 4, respectively.34
While useful to complement our analysis, these data suf-
fer from a number of limitations which prevent us from
basing our analysis fully on them. First, in 2001/2002, there
are extremely few PJD supporters. Only 19 respondents
identified themselves as PJD supporters. This limits
severely the ability to draw inferences on the characteristic
of these supporters from the sample. In 2007, the number of
PJD supporters is substantially higher (243), but the
answers on party support are problematic in other respects.
There seems to be an over-reporting of PJD support and an
under-reporting of abstention compared to the elections
held almost contemporaneously. Twenty percent of the
respondents identify as PJD supporters compared to the
3.3 percent that actually voted for them.35 Even more sur-
prisingly, only 54 percent of the sample said that they
would abstain, significantly less than the abstention rate
in the 2007 elections (63 percent) and the reported absten-
tion for the latest elections in the same survey (62 percent).
This suggests that respondents in these surveys feel differ-
ently at the moment of the survey than on election day and
that their intended support differs significantly from their
actual electoral support.
We consider first the link between education and PJD
support. Figures 5 and 6 show the percentage of PJD sup-
port for different levels of educational attainment in
2001/2002 and 2007, respectively. Unambiguously, PJD
support increases with education in both years. The differ-
ences are substantial: university graduates are more than
twice as likely to vote for the PJD as individuals with no
education in both years. For 2007 (where the sample of PJD
supporters is higher and therefore point estimates are more
trustworthy) the figure increases from 15 percent to more
than 30 percent.
To study the role of class conditional on education, we
perform a simple regression of PJD support on education
and the class variable. The estimates for the two years,
using OLS, are presented in Table 10.
The results for both years convey the same message as
those we obtained with the district level data. The coeffi-
cient for education is positive and strongly significant in
both years. It is particularly remarkable that the result for
2002 is significant, given the small number of PJD voters
in the sample. The results for class point at an increasing
class gradient of PJD support over the time period consid-
ered. While for 2002 the class coefficient is essentially
zero (actually negative, although highly insignificant), it
becomes positive and quite significant for 2007.
Table 9. The grievance profile of the Party of Abstention.
2002 2007
(Intercept) 46.33 (5.433)** 42.53 (6.610)** 43.89 (6.204)** 38.31 (8.168)**
Urban 0.16 (0.061)** 0.08 (0.068) 0.16 (0.066)* 0.04 (0.082)
Literacy –0.02 (0.148) 0.13 (0.203) 0.33 (0.164)* 0.52 (0.235)*
Public employees –0.46 (0.090)** –0.83 (0.102)**
Satellite dishes –0.2 (0.102)* –0.31 (0.123)*
Dependent variable: Abstentions as percent of registered voters.
**Significance at the 1% level; *Significance at the 10% level.
Figure 5. Level of education and PJD support in 2011. Figure 6. Level of education and PJD support in 2007.
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In sum, the data from the WVS increase our confidence
in our previous findings on PJD support in Morocco. They
confirm the importance of education for PJD support and
lend further evidence to the hypothesis of a change in the
pattern of support towards horizontal network and away
from grievance. Interestingly, as was the case with the
aggregate data, the evidence for the horizontal network
profile in 2007 is stronger than that for the grievance profile
in 2002.
The PJD’s mobilization pattern: From opposition
to technocracy
Qualitative evidence on the PJD’s mobilization pattern
since the late 1990s additionally supports our conclusion
that the profile of PJD supporters is likely to have evolved
from grievance to the horizontal network type of profile. As
argued in section 2, the potential appeal of Islamist parties
for grievance-driven citizens stems from the oppositional
stance many Islamist groups take towards their political
regimes and the established elites. Thus, grievance voters
would support an Islamist party as long as this party repre-
sents a credible opposition and mobilizes energetically. In
contrast, horizontal network voters want incremental
change only. Being better off than grievance voters, they
would support an Islamist party platform focusing on better
services, anti-corruption and efficiency.
Analysing the PJD’s mobilization pattern we see
indeed a change from a more decisive oppositional profile
in the late 1990s and early 2000s to one that focuses more
on concrete socio-economic policies afterwards. The PJD
positioned itself as a clear opposition party after the death
of King Hassan II in 1999 – two years after the party’s first
electoral participation. Although it never confronted the
regime directly or advocated radical change and policies,
it did mobilize strongly against established political elites
and their practices and pushed for constitutional reforms.
Its key message was its difference to other political parties
in Morocco (Wegner, 2007, 2011). In the context of the
co-optation of the former opposition into government and
their inability to achieve meaningful and visible political
change and socio-economic development, the PJD estab-
lished itself successfully as the only credible alternative
to voters. Its electoral platform in 2002 included calls for
substantial constitutional changes. The party could count
on the full support of the Islamist Movement of Unity
and Reform (MUR), who urged its activists to mobilize
for the party and ran a full-fledged campaign for it in its
newspaper, al-Tajdid (Wegner, 2011). In the 2002 elec-
tions, PJD votes more than doubled compared to 1997and
the party’s share of seats more than tripled. In combina-
tion with the analysis of the electoral data above, we sug-
gest that a substantial part of these new voters came from
grievance voters who saw the PJD as an outlet for polit-
ical protest and for signalling their disaffection with the
establishment.
The PJD remained in opposition after these elections
and first continued along previous lines. This, however,
changed dramatically after Islamist terrorist attacks in
2003 allowed political elites to effectively lay the blame
on the PJD. Fearing for the legal survival of the party, the
leadership adjusted the themes, intensity and locus of its
political mobilization. The PJD started to focus on man-
agement/administration, development and growth. This
was already the case for the municipal elections in the
autumn of 2003 and remained so for the 2007 parliamen-
tary elections. The style of its mobilization also changed
away from street protest to the political institutions (i.e.
proposing amendments, work in the parliamentary com-
mittees). Having dropped unconditional support of
Islamic identity themes, the party also lost the blessing
of the MUR, which ceased to lend a hand in the party’s
campaign in 2007 (Wegner, 2011; Wegner and Pellicer,
2010). For these elections, the party invested heavily in
a new platform that targeted middle class voters, that is,
essentially the horizontal network type of voters (ibid.).
The party took special care to present itself as a competent
respectable party fit for cabinet participation. In these
elections, the PJD lost close to 100,000 votes, although
by simply maintaining previous support levels these votes
should have increased ‘mechanically’ given that the party
had covered the totality of electoral districts for the first
time. Combined with the analysis above, we suggest that
the voters lost by the PJD consisted chiefly of grievance
voters, who, having lost a party via which to articulate
their protest, abstained this time (see Table 9). Horizontal
network voters, in contrast, became the key electoral basis
of the party. Indeed, this corresponds to the PJD’s own
perceptions about its 2007 electorate: party leaders unan-
imously believed the middle class to be their key
electorate.36
In sum, changes in the PJD’s mobilization pattern match
well the changes in the electorate suggested by our analysis
of electoral data. When it mobilized as an opposition party,
the PJD attracted grievance voters, once it ceased to do so,
it was considered as yet another co-opted party, and grie-
vance voters abandoned it again. Horizontal network voters
kept their support and potentially increased it alongside the
PJD’s heavy targeting of them.
Table 10. OLS regressions of PJD votes on education and social
class in 2002 and 2007.
2002 2007
Intercept 0.005 (0.003)** 0.12 (0.023)**
Education 0.008 (0.003)** 0.06 (0.014)**
Class –0.0001 (0.002) 0.03 (0.017)*
Dependent variable: PJD vote intention. Standard errors in parentheses.
**Significance at the 1% level; *Significance at the 10% level.
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Conclusion
This article studied patterns of electoral support for the
Moroccan Islamist party in 2002 and 2007. The key com-
monality found across time was that voters did not support
the PJD for clientelistic reasons: PJD voters were too
highly educated to vote for such motives. Besides, the pro-
file of PJD voters was changing between 2002 and 2007, in
tandem with the party’s mobilization decisions. Whereas
the party initially attracted grievance voters, interested in
voicing their disaffection with the system and the elites sus-
taining and benefiting from it, it ceased to do so once it
adopted a tamer attitude towards the regime. Instead, the
party attracted a middle class type of voter interested in
incremental change. Grievances were then voiced either
by abstaining or by casting null votes.
Our findings thus suggest that voters of Islamist parties
are not a stable group of staunch Islamist activists casting a
sure vote for ideological reasons. Rather, support for Isla-
mist parties is fluid. On the one hand, it depends on factors
relating to the policies offered by a specific party and how
credible the party is to the voters. On the other hand, it is
influenced by factors that vary across countries, such as, for
instance, the size of the welfare organizations of the Islamist
organizations associated with the party. Indeed, a possible
reason behind the incapacity of the Moroccan Islamists to
attract poor and less educated voters might be that, compared
to Islamist movements in the Mashrek, such as the Muslim
Brotherhoods in Jordan and Egypt or Hizbullah in Lebanon,
their welfare efforts are small. In these countries, support for
the Islamists might well follow a different logic, possibly
resembling more the clientelistic profile.
Finally, our study suggests that the strength displayed by
the Moroccan Islamists in 2002 – when it doubled the num-
ber of votes received – was largely the result of positioning
itself as a credible opposition. This might be true for other
Islamist parties as well, given that other opposition groups
have largely been co-opted and regimes in power
lack legitimacy. Here, however, political parties in semi-
authoritarian regimes walk a thin line: while too little pro-
test might alienate voters, too much might prompt
re-exclusion from official politics.
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Notes
1. The 2001/2002 World Values Survey data used by Garcia
Rivero and Kotze contain only 19 supporters of the Islamist
party in Morocco. The Arab Barometer data have 16 observa-
tions of Islamist party support for Jordan, 66 in Algeria (much
lower than in elections), 106 for Yemen and 121 for Morocco.
Only for the West Bank and Gaza does the figure reach 500.
2. The figure that is widely quoted is 13.5 percent of votes; it
corresponds to PJD votes as percentage of the votes cast.
3. This could imply that it is rather the actual results that under-
represent Islamist support due to fraud. For this particular
Moroccan election, however, there was no indication of fraud
of that magnitude (see below).
4. For our purpose of extracting measurable profiles from the lit-
erature, we necessarily need to simplify strongly. We are thus
unable to incorporate more nuanced accounts, such as those
of Kepel (2000) or Roy (1992). Kepel stresses the alliance
of the poor Youth that are products of the rural exode, a pious
bourgeoisie and university graduates that could be seen in
many movements from the 1970s to the 1990s; Roy empha-
sizes the categories of the ‘lumpenintelligentisa’ and univer-
sity graduates in Islamist movements.
5. See also Cammett and Issar (2010), who argue that differ-
ences in service delivery strategies of Islamist organizations
in Lebanon are due to different electoral concerns of these
organizations.
6. Palmer Harik (1996) refers to a similar type of profile as
‘political alienation’.
7. For political parties in Morocco, see Santucci (2001) and
Willis (2002a, b).
8. See Storm (2007) for political development in Morocco since
independence and political liberalization in the 1990s.
9. For the performance of the alternance government, see Ferrie´
(2002) and Hidass (2001).
10. Crucially, the group refuses to recognize the King’s religious
authority – a precondition for political participation in Mor-
occo (Tozy, 1999a).
11. Justice and Charity activists, however, might not always fol-
low these instructions and are thought to be among the PJD
voters (Willis, 2004).
12. For the Islamist movement in Morocco, see especially Tozy
(1999a), Shahin (1997) and Zeghal (2005).
13. For a detailed analysis tracing the path of the PJD, see
Wegner (2011).
14. A much publicized poll by the International Republican Insti-
tute attributed 47 percent vote intention to the PJD.
15. In 2002 there were 91 multi-member electoral districts; in
2007 there were 95. The 2002 election results were published
in REMALD 2003. The 2007 election results were published
by the Moroccan interior ministry (available at http://www.
elections.gov.ma/index.aspx).
16. Out in the countryside, municipalities are collections of vil-
lages; in large cities they represent rather the neighbourhood
level.
17. The census data used in this study were obtained directly
from the department of statistics of the Haut Commissariat
du Plan in Rabat. Most of the data are also available at the
website of the Haut Commissariat (http://www.hcp.ma/
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Profil.aspx). Some of the variables of the online version,
however, are defined slightly differently.
18. A good illustration of the variation in satellite dishes follow-
ing differences in wealth levels comes from comparing the
districts in Casablanca. In slum districts (those with more
than 50 percent of slums), only 16 percent had satellite dishes.
In contrast, in richer districts (with less than 10 percent of
slums), 52 percent had satellite dishes.
19. As shown in the table, no district is uniformly wealthy (the
district with most villas has only 10 percent). Thus, the upper
end of the distribution will not be well captured.
20. In 2002, the PJD covered only around 60 percent of the elec-
toral districts. Limited coverage in these as well as the 1997
elections was imposed by the regime as a condition for elec-
toral participation. The choice of the covered districts was left
to the PJD. Assuming that the party chose to cover districts
where it knew it had support, the profile of non-covered dis-
tricts is still meaningful for analysing the PJD’s support.
21. These outliers are Larache and Oued Zem-Bejaad, where the
PJD has governed an important town since 2003 (Ksar el Kbir
and Oued Zem, respectively).
22. This holds with the exception of the last column – represent-
ing the outliers Larache and Oued Zem-Bejaad – in 2007.
These two are not more urban, more educated, etc. Quite the
contrary, they are very similar to those where the PJD did
badly and should be considered squarely ‘average’ places in
Morocco: average education, occupational structure, etc. The
high levels of support in these two districts are probably the
result of PJD government of these towns. Pellicer and
Wegner (2009) show how PJD votes in these towns increased
in tandem with a skyrocketing of investment expenditures.
This might suggest that the PJD is not adverse to a clientelis-
tic linkage strategy per se once it gains access to the neces-
sary resources through governance. It could also imply that
citizens simply reward the development efforts of local poli-
ticians in towns that have been neglected previously.
23. Indeed, a more erratic conditional distribution would make an
ecological fallacy more of a concern. Suppose that the whole
positive relation were driven by the few districts with high
levels of education displaying high PJD votes. Then it would
be possible that it is the uneducated in those districts that, for
some reason emerging from the particularities of those dis-
tricts, vote in larger numbers for the PJD.
24. Some aspects of the rural/urban divide can be meaningful for
clientelism; for instance, the type of social structure. But the
rural/urban divide of Islamist support in Morocco could also
be unrelated to clientelism given that the Moroccan Islamist
movement has most activists in towns (Munson, 1986).
25. For similar trends in abstention in other MENA countries,
see Tlemcani (2007). Electoral Authoritarianism, Al Ahram
Weekly.
26. The only exception is the USFP in 2002, the party less asso-
ciated with clientelism in the Moroccan system. Until the
alternance, this was an urban party with a protest agenda.
In the first post-alternance elections, parts of this past USFP
identity are still evidenced, however, the pattern disappears
for the USFP in 2007, as the party lost credibility by its gov-
ernment participation and tame attitude towards the regime.
27. These indicators are most appropriate for the more traditional
clientelistic parties found in Arab countries and sub-Saharan
Africa (Van deWalle, 2007). They do not necessarily hold for
the machine-type of clientelistic party that will also have a
strong and centralized party organization.
28. The party also changed its top leadership in both the 2004 and
2008 party congresses as an outcome of internal elections.
29. The 2002 graph is essentially the same. Recall that demo-
graphic characteristics are taken from the 2004 census and
so are taken to be the same in the two elections.
30. We are confident that these groups do indeed capture differ-
ent levels of inclusion into state networks and that the per-
centage of public employees is thus a good indicator of
inclusion in Morocco. This is quite clear when considering
the case of the South compared to the middle sized towns.
The Southern districts – displaying a high degree of public
employees given their literacy – border or belong to theWest-
ern Sahara, a disputed area at the core of Moroccan foreign
policy and nationalist mobilization. Their cooptation into
state networks of privilege is thus crucial and the fact that
turnout there is much higher (52 percent) and null votes much
lower (16 percent) than in the middle sized towns (32 and 22
percent, respectively) shows that the strategy is rather suc-
cessful. A similar picture emerges from the comparison
among the highly educated districts, although much less
extreme, with the Rabat area displaying 37 percent of turnout
and 22 percent of null votes versus the Casablanca area where
the figures are 26 and 27 percent, respectively.
31. The increase of support in the south and in the rural areas is
mostly due to the fact that these districts had not been covered
in 2002.
32. Notice that the values of PJD support are not the same as in
the table using exclusion because the groups formed by using
public employees are not the same as those using resources as
the grouping variable. Resources are thus to a certain extent
independent from the share of public employees. That the
conclusions are the same thus means that the analysis using
resources provides a useful robustness check of our main
results.
33. As a further robustness check, the analysis was repeated using
different specifications (available upon request). First, we
used different proxies – university education as a proxy for
education and mobile phones and percent of people working
in the liberal professions as proxy for resources. Second, we
repeated the analysis using the alternative dataset for 2002,
where we are also able to use primary and secondary school
as proxy for education. The results regarding education are
very robust. In all specifications, the education proxy appears
positive and significant, confirming the results in section 5.
The same applies to exclusion: public employees appear
insignificant in 2007 and negative and significant in 2002
even using the alternative dataset. Regarding resources,
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results were robust for 2007 (always insignificant), but less so
for 2002 (generally the proxy for resources failed to be signif-
icant and in one case was even positive).
34. The self-ranking of respondents in terms of ‘class’ was the
only wealth indicator available in both surveys. In 2001/
2002, respondents were also asked to position themselves in
income brackets. Given that this correlated strongly with the
social class indicated by respondents, we consider the latter to
be an appropriate indicator of wealth.
35. The discrepancy is even greater than these numbers suggest,
because the percent in the sample is of the total population
over 18, while the actual percent is only over registered vot-
ers, a smaller denominator.
36. Authors’ interviews in November 2007. Some were more pre-
cise in terms of income, stating that key supporters were ‘peo-
ple with an income between 7,000 and 10,000–15,000 dirham
(DH) per month’ (interview, Rabat, 6 November 2007). For
comparison, the legal minimum wage is 1900 DH; the aver-
age private wage in the formal sector is 4,000 and the aver-
age public wage 10,000 DH. Others defined the boundaries
in terms of occupation, with supporters being somewhere
between primary school teachers and medical doctors (inter-
view, Rabat, 5 November 2007). Other types of characteri-
zations were: ‘Someone who doesn’t struggle for basic
needs and cares about leisure’; and, perhaps the most illumi-
nating: ‘People that have a house with two rooms, but would
need 3 or 4; that have a small car but would like a bigger
one’ (authors’ interviews, Rabat, 5 and 6 November 2007,
respectively).
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